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Abstract
This paper examines the predictability of exchange rates on a transaction
level basis using both past transaction prices and the structure of the order
book. In contrast to the existing literature we also recognise that the trader
may be subject to (Knightian) uncertainty as opposed to risk regarding the
structure by which exchange rates are determined and hence regarding both the
model he employs to make predictions and the reliability of any conditioning
information. The trader is faced with a two stage decision problem due to this
uncertainty; first he needs to resolve a question of market timing as to when to
enter the market and then secondly how to trade. We provide a formalisation
for this two stage decision problem. Statistical tests indicate the significance of
out of sample ability to predict directional changes and the economic value of
predictability using one week of tick-by-tick data on the USD-DM exchange rate
drawn from Reuters DM2002 electronic trading system. These conclusions rest
critically on the frequency of trading which is controlled by an inertia parameter
reflecting the degree of uncertainty; trading too frequently significantly reduces
profitability taking account of transaction costs.
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1 Introduction
Considerable research has been devoted over a number of years to examining the pre-
dictability of foreign exchange rates following the classic paper by Meese and Rogoff
(1983). One reasonable interpretation of this work is that it has been found to be dif-
ficult to convincingly overturn their result regarding the inability of standard “macro”
based exchange rate models to beat a random walk in out of sample forecasting exer-
cises. Clearly this broad statement could be qualified as research has appeared which
claims to provide evidence of predictability in particular exchange rates and over par-
ticular sample periods (see for instance Abhyankar, Sarno and Valente (2005)) but the
general impression remains that standard fundamentals based models do not consis-
tently dominate a random walk.
At the same time there has been a major development in what has become known
as the New Micro Approach to Exchange Rates (see for instance Lyons (2001)) in
which attention is focussed more on the characteristics and micro structure of the FX
market itself rather than the macro fundamentals that drive the traditional theories of
exchange rate determination. In the light of Messe and Rogoff’s results this distinction
is critical since any statement regarding predictability is necessarily conditional on the
information set employed. A variable may appear to be completely unpredictable if ir-
relevant data is used as the conditioning information and yet may be highly predictable
if the correct conditioning data is used. While both approaches, micro and macro, seek
to explain the same exchange rate which is determined on a tick by tick basis in the
spot market, they obviously differ critically in the information sets they use to explain
exchange rate movements and hence forecast.
In this paper we present what we believe to be the first rigorous tests of pre-
dictability of an exchange rate using irregularly spaced tick by tick FX data where the
information set involves both the past price history and information on the structure
of the order book. Secondly we attempt to formally recognise the uncertainty that
a foreign exchange trader faces given that any model he uses to generate forecasts
and trading decisions will be incorrect in ways that he cannot capture in a unique
probability distribution. We therefore allow our trader’s decisions to reflect Knightian
Uncertainty rather than simply risk. In short we find clear evidence of predictability
both in terms of directional change and economic value after taking account of trans-
actions costs when the frequency of trades is controlled. The predictors are based on
genetic algorithms applied to the tick by tick data and evaluated over a three day
out of sample period. White’s reality check is employed to insulate the results from
any data snooping bias. The prediction rules are also compared with the results from
applying several classic Technical Rules which are shown to indicate substantially less
predictability and profitability than the GA trading rules we employ. A further some-
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what surprising result is that the we find little or no advantage in allowing the predictor
to exploit information in the order book. This result is exactly the opposite of what
we had expected before carrying out the empirical work but would be consistent with
the market price acting as a sufficient statistic and hence that no further information
is useful.
Our objective is not to re-examine the question of the predictability of technical
rules but to mirror the way in which technical rules appear to be used in practice
by currency traders when making their trading decisions. In the first place, there is
considerable evidence (see for instance Taylor and Allen (1992), Lui and Mole (1996))
that traders largely use technical rules only for short run decision making, which jus-
tifies our use of tick by tick data. Traders also do not follow a single rule but form
an impression as to where the market is moving on the basis of a number of technical
indicators, dropping those that appear not to have worked well.1 Secondly we formalise
the sequential decision making seen in financial markets where an initial decision must
be taken as to when to enter the market – the question of market timing – alongside
the decision of how to trade. The market timing decision is intimately related to the
degree of uncertainty the trader faces; when he is confident in the direction the market
is moving he will act quickly and when he is uncertain he will show inertia and be
reluctant to trade.
Our results would seem to justify the investment that has been made by a number
of financial institutions to develop and apply automatic trading systems2. This does
suggest the correct interpretation of the Messe and Rogoff conclusion lies in the fact that
the correct conditioning information set had not been used rather than that exchange
rates are in fact unpredictable. In addition we show that even when you have the correct
information it is critically how and when it is used that determines if profitability will
appear since unless the frequency of trading is controlled, profitability disappears. The
frequency of trading is controlled by means of an “inertia” parameter reflecting the
degree of uncertainty and ensures the system can only trade when the predicted price
change is beyond some threshold level (taking transactions costs into account). Human
traders clearly do not trade in real time as frequently as our unconstrained trading rules
would suggest and so restricting the frequency of trades simple reflects reality.
In the next sections we briefly review the existing literature in this area and then
discuss the derivation and application of the Genetic Algorithm trading rules, the
testing procedures we have employed before turning to report our results.
1We have benefited from detailed discussions with the chief currency trader at the Bank of England
and the Royal Bank of Scotland regarding their use of technical analysis.
2We know, for instance, of one major bank that has an automatic trading system in place that
inspects 1200 currency pairs in real time and we are told delivers profits of the order of 500 million
Euro annually.
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2 Predictability and Market Timing
Most existing statistical analysis suggests at best weak predictability in the FX mar-
ket. At the same time, we can clearly observe trends, ex post, in exchange rates over
particular periods of time which might imply ex ante short term predictability if the
correct conditioning information can be found and potentially short term arbitrage
opportunities. To state the obvious; the issue of market timing is intimately connected
to the degree of predictability in a market. Even if there is no predictability over a
long period or on average, it may be possible to forecast at some point of time over a
short period. It may be more important to identify these moments in time rather than
attempting to find a predictor which has good properties on average as is traditionally
the case.
In the paper we use a two stage combined predictor in which the first step provides a
market timing indicator and the second gives a forecast of the future exchange rate and
a related trade. The market timing indicator effectively serves as a filter, extracting
irrelevant or uncertain information and noise from the time series data and then the
trader uses this filtered information set to take decisions in the market.
The more formal description of the individual’s preferences is given in the following
section.
2.1 Uncertainty Aversion and Inertia
An investor in real life is invariably faced with different types of uncertainty while mak-
ing trading decisions in a market. This uncertainty might be due to changing market
structure, estimation error or model uncertainty, lack of information, imprecision of
information of imperfect trading signals. Risk is defined by the probability of events
described by an assumed model structure and a unique probability distribution. We are
more concerned with capturing the uncertainty in decision making, beyond risk, which
results if there is a lack of knowledge about which model and probability distribution
to use. Risk calculus, as employed for instance in VaR or expected utility calculations,
is relatively straightforward and provides a confidence interval as the basis for action.
However, when we recognise that incorrect decisions can follow from inaccuracy in the
assumed model or probability distribution we need to employ additional tools to decide
whether to trust a predictor or not. Each transaction is costly because of transaction
costs and if future prices do not change as predicted by the model the investor will
inevitably lose money. In order to filter weak trading signals we need some rule that
suggests you only trade if the predicted value exceeds some threshold that reflects the
degree of uncertainty.
Knight’s characterisation (Knight 1921) of uncertainty refers to situations when
there is no unique probability model supporting traders’ decisions. In this case ex-
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pected utility fails to be an appropriate model by which to predict or make trading
decisions. Technical indicators may in fact reflect the Knightian concept of uncertainty
more accurately than expected utility based predictors since they are often viewed as
distribution free methods of predicting future prices. However, even technical rules are
recognised as being imprecise and may deliver incorrect forecasts which is why tech-
nical analysts tend to use several technical indicators simultaneously or interval based
rules like Bollinger Bands or stop-loss strategies.
The use of these strategies brings some inertia to the trading process which makes
trading less frequent. This notion of trading inertia is entirely consistent with the
question of market timing since it implies that the investor does not trade at every
feasible point of time but does so by trying to choose the best moment when to enter
the market.
There are several ways how the theory of decision-making under uncertainty can
be used to model the observed inertia in the market. One of the classic examples
is the no-trade condition introduced by Dow and Werlang (1992). Once the trader
observes this condition in the market, he becomes “uncertain” about a particular asset
and excludes it from his portfolio and doesn’t trade the asset again until the condition
disappears. This phenomenon describes some kind of extreme uncertainty aversion
in the agent who will have different degrees of uncertainty regarding each asset in the
market reflecting the different degree of confidence he has in his information set. It may
also be that the investor is uncertain about the market as a whole in that he does not
see value in any alternative to his current position. This implies that his position will
change only if there is another portfolio which clearly dominates his existing portfolio.
2.1.1 The Market entry/ exit Decision
Theoretical support for preferences with trading inertia has been introduced by Bewley
(1986) (see also Bewley (2002), Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci (2004)) and we
now provide a short description of the simplified version of the Bewley’s approach that
we will employ.
Uncertainty Averse Preferences. Let S be a set of states (of the market) and
let B be the σ-algebra of its Borel sets. An act is a measurable bounded function
f : S → R and let L ⊂ RS be the set of all acts on S, i.e., a set of random payoffs
available at the moment for decision-making. In our case we consider acts as the return
the agent receives from his trades. Effectively, L represent a set of alternative strategies
in the market to which the trader is restricted.
There is a binary preference relation $ua (stands for ”uncertainty aversion”) defined
on L and let it satisfy the following axioms.
A1. Monotonicity If f(s) > g(s) for all s ∈ S then f $ua g.
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A2. Transitivity If f $ua g and g $ua h then f $ua h.
A3. Openness For all f ∈ L, {g ∈ L : g $ua f} is open L.
A4. Independence For all f, g, h ∈ L and for all α ∈ (0, 1), g $ h if and only if
αf + (1− α)g $ua αf + (1− α)h.
Theorem 2.1. (Bewley, 2002) If $ua satisfies Axioms A1-A4, then there is a closed
convex set P of probability measures on S such that
(i) for all f and g and B ∈ B we have f $ua g if and only if EP (f) > EP (g) for
all P ∈ P;
(ii) for all P ∈ P, P (B) > 0 for each non-empty B ∈ B.
The set of probability measures P reflects the trader’s uncertainty. The key point
in the preceding theorem is that the preference relation $ua is not complete leading to
a set of probability measures P rather than a unique measure as in the expected utility
theory. This means that there may exist two acts which are “incomparable” and the
decision-maker can not distinguish which is better nor in fact whether he is indifferent
as he does not have sufficient information to evaluate the different options. The notion
of incomparability is critically distinct from indifference. The latter means that if the
decision-maker is indifferent between f and g he will definitely prefer f + ε rather than
g if ε > 0. In the case of incomparability the investor needs more information beyond
f in order to compare two alternatives. This may imply that the decision-maker is not
fully rational as discussed in Bewley (2002). If the decision-maker can unambiguously
distinguish between two acts then we say that acts f and g are “comparable” and
denote this by f ≶ua g.
There are different solutions as to how to act when there are incomparable portfolios
in the market. One is to randomly choose one of them, another is to assume that the
investor has a subjective distribution over the set of priors (a probability measure
over probability measures) and carries out some form of averaging with respect to his
beliefs. This approach leads to Bayesian Model Averaging and its generalization as
discussed in Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005). Instead we adopt the inertia
approach proposed in Bewley (2002). This implies that the decision-maker will change
his portfolio only if a new portfolio strictly dominates it. In order to formalize this we
denote by ft the optimal portfolio for the investor at time t.
Inertia Assumption For each t1 < t2, ft1 '= ft2 ⇔ ft2 $ua ft1 .
This means that the next choice of the investor will need to strongly dominate the
preceding position otherwise they coincide (the previous position will not be changed).
He will not update the position in three further cases: if the alternative is worse than
the current one, if he is indifferent between the alternative and the current position
(i.e., their expected values with respect to all priors coincide) and if the alternative is
“incomparable” with the current position. Thus, if the agent does not see any strictly
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better alternative to his current portfolio he will not trade until the situation changes.
If a new alternative arises which is preferable according to every measure in the prior
set, the trader will change his current position. In a real market this inertia is also
justified by the presence of transaction costs since an investor would have to pay to
switch to an incomparable portfolio which would not be rational.
Although this representation of Bewley’s preferences allows us to model trading
inertia, it does not provide guidance as to which alternative to choose when faced
with several “incomparable” positions each of which is strictly better than the current
position. For example, Bewley’s preferences do not provide an answer as to what the
decision-maker holding the portfolio f should do if there exist g and h such that g $ua f
and h $ua f . It may happen that g and h are not comparable. If this is the case, the
decision-maker will get a signal that he needs to change his current portfolio, given
there are better portfolios than f in the market (both g and h in our case) but he does
not know which alternative, g or h to choose.
In order to fill this gap we propose two different preference relations in the space of
risky payoffs and construct a composite indicator which the decision-maker uses. The
first indicator is based on Bewley’s preferences $ua as described above which represents
the trader’s perception of uncertainty and serves as a market timing indicator informing
the trader that he should alter his current position. The second indicator, td, (stands
for ”trading”) changes the trading direction and determines the quantity traded. We
denote the corresponding preference relation by )td. We do not provide any specific
axiomatization for the)td preference relation here as it may be any subjective predictor
based on a complete preference relation that the trader is willing to use: either based
on the expected utility model or a technical indicator or simply the trader’s intuition.
The composite preference relation ) is then defined as follows:
g ) f ⇔ (g ≶ua f) ∧ (g )td f).
Effectively decision-making based on the preference relation ) is split into two stages:
market timing and trading. The uncertainty aversion preference relation $ua does not
indicate whether one asset is better than another; rather it provides the degree of
confidence for the trader that the td indicator has predictive power at the particular
point of time. It gives a signal whether it is possible to say that there is an asset
structure which unambiguously dominates the current position. If this is the case then
the td indicator specifies the clear action of the trader. This trading strategy reflects
the “rules-of-thumb” used by technical traders in reality. Indeed, as we have already
mentioned, generally technical traders use several indicators in order to be confident
they correctly predict the future market direction. Such a composite indicator is more
robust since the trading signal is confirmed by both the td and ua rules.
In order to specify the preference relation more precisely we shall make use of a
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simple example. Assume that there are two assets in the market – one risky and one
risk-free. The agent has only three possibilities: invest his wealth in the risk-free asset,
invest everything in risky asset or take a short position in the risky asset which is equal
to his current wealth. The current wealth level is denoted by W0. The current price
of the risky asset is p0 and its future price is a positive random variable p. The gross
return of the risk-free asset is 1+r. In order to define the set of priors for the model we
fix a measure P0 on the probability space (S,B). We assume that all measures in the set
P are absolutely continuous with respect to the measure P0. By the Radon-Nikodym
theorem for every measure Q ∈ P there exists a non-negative random variable ηQ with
EP0(ηQ) = 1, such that dQ = ηQdP0. Therefore, we can identify the set of priors P with
the set of their Radon-Nikodym derivatives with respect to the probability measure P0.
The price expectation under the measure Q can be expressed as EQ(p) = p˜ + kQ,
where p˜ = EP0(p) and kQ = covP0(p, ηQ). Indeed, EQ(p) = EP0(ηQp) = covP0(p, ηQ) +
EP0(p)EP0(ηQ) = kQ + p˜.
Let the set of Radon-Nykodym derivatives of the measures in P satisfy the condition
C = {covP0(p, ηQ) : Q ∈ P} = [−kmin, kmax] with kmin, kmax > 0. This assumption
characterises the set of priors of the decision-maker.
Let the investor initially only hold the risk-free asset. Then, according to Theorem
2.1, under the above preferences he will decide to switch to the risky asset if EQ(
p
p0
) >
EQ(1+r) = 1+r for all Q ∈ P , or equivalently p˜+k > p0(1+r) for all k ∈ [−kmin, kmax].
Thus, the agent takes a long position if p˜ > p0(1 + r) + kmin.
If the agent decides to double his holding in the risk-free asset, he borrows W0p0 ,
converts it into cash and invests in the risky asset. At the end of the next period the
investor buys W0p0 shares of the risky asset and repays his debt. Thus, the final wealth
can be calculated by W1 = 2W0(1 + r) − W0pp0 and the return of the short position is
2(1 + r)− pp0 .
The investor will prefer the short position to the risk-free asset if 2(1+ r)− EQ(p)p0 >
1+r or equivalently p˜ < p0(1+r)−kmax. Combining these two inequalities we conclude
that if p0(1 + r)− kmax ≤ p˜ ≤ p0(1 + r) + kmin the decision-maker decides to keep his
portfolio unchanged according to the inertia assumption.3 In the case k = kmin = kmax
(a symmetric band) the latter inequality is simplified to |p˜− p0(1 + r)| ≤ k.
The main implication of the example is that there exists a no-trade band around
the predicted value of the alternative portfolio which determines the market timing
condition. That is, if the value of the proposed portfolio lies within the band then the
investor does not rebalance his current portfolio and the converse implies the “trade”
signal.
Note that our no-trade band is different from the no-trade condition of Dow and
3We can also obtain the inertia band under more relaxed assumption for the multiple prior set,
e.g., C = {covP0(p, ηQ) : Q ∈ P} ⊂ R is bounded and inf C = −kmin and supC = kmax.
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Werlang (1992). Under Dow and Werlang’s condition the investor exits the market
and does not re-enter until the condition vanishes. In our case the trader does not exit
the market but waits and holds his current portfolio until a better alternative arises.
We consider the simplest case with two assets in the market – long and short
positions in the foreign currency. If denote by f the position held at time t which was
bought at time t0 for price pt0 then we say that there exists a position g such that
f ≶ua g ⇔ |pt0 − pt| > k for some pre-defined positive k, where pt is the current price
of the asset g. This can be interpreted as implying there is no asset structure in the
market which dominates the one held until the transaction price change is predicted
to be large enough. The constant k reflects trader’s subjective attitude to uncertainty
in the market. The larger k, the wider the band of inertia which leads to less frequent
trading. For the sake of simplicity below we use a symmetric interval for the market
timing indicator. Once the price change happens to be big enough the trader uses the
td indicator to determine his action in the market. In our case the td rule is provided
by a genetic algorithm trading rule which is discussed in the following section.
3 Technical Analysis and Predictability
The debate as to whether using Technical Analysis results in significant profitability
has probably been running ever since the Dow Theory came into existence between
1900-1902 when Charles Dow suggested that the direction of prices in “The Industrial
Average”, made up of 12 blue chip stocks and “The Rail Average”, made up of 20
railroad companies appeared to be based on a set of rules.
In an early study Fama and Blume (1966), investigated the importance of Technical
Rules while analyzing foreign exchange markets and Dooley and Shafer (1976) obtained
results in favor of the profitability of similar filter rules. Sweeney (1986) confirmed these
positive results and proved their statistical significance. Carol Osler has demonstrated
in several papers (Osler (2003), Osler (2000), Chang and Osler (1999), Chang and
Osler (1995) and Savin, Weller and Zvingelis (2007))the potential for profitability of
more sophisticated technical rules in FX markets such as head and shoulder patterns.
Whereas most technical indicators are based simply on historical prices or returns, other
information also can be useful in order to form expectations of future prices. Neely and
Weller (2001) show that including information on US foreign exchange interventions
improves the profitability of their trading rules.
However, the practical relevance of much of this research has equally been called
into question. Neely and Weller (2003) for instance emphasise the critical role of trans-
action costs and inconsistences between the data used by practitioners and in academic
simulations; although most traders transact in real time the majority of the earlier aca-
demic studies (Dooley and Shafer (1983), Sweeney (1986), Levich and Thomas (1993),
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Neely, Weller and Dittmar (1997)) report the profitability from using technical rules
but use daily or weekly data which is clearly unrealistic and misrepresents the informa-
tion set available to the trader in practice when making a trade using technical analysis.
The literature in which high-frequency trading rules are investigated is limited. Curcio,
Goodhart, Guillaume and Payne (1997) consider intra-day FX data aggregated to one
hour and find little or no evidence of profitability outside of periods when the exchange
rate is trending. Neely and Weller (2003) using half hourly quote data find considerable
out of sample predictability which does not translate into profitability once transaction
costs are taken into account which they claim supports the efficiency of the FX market.
The research most closely related to our own is that of Michael Dempster (Dempster
and Jones (2001)) who applied GP generated rules to FX transaction data with one
minute aggregation for trading but with indicators evaluated at fifteen minutes. To
quote from their conclusions - they find “the return from the 20 strategy portfolio
system trading at fifteen minute entry intervals is small and statistically insignificant
and is in fact less than the interest differential between pounds and dollars over the
same sample period. ... better excess returns would have be available from a static
buy and hold strategy.... When only the best strategy is employed it is modestly and
statistically significantly profitable (returning 7%)”.
We seek to extend this literature by focussing on transaction level data - in other
words irregularly spaced transacted prices as opposed to quotes or temporally aggre-
gated data and by including the structure of the order book in the information set
available to the trader or automatic trading system. Secondly as discussed above we
introduce uncertainty into the trading process. We also focus on rigorous testing of
both directional change and economic value and use White’s reality check to immunise
our results from any Data Snooping bias.
3.1 The Genetic Trading Rule
We want to consider evaluating predictability as generally as possible and so it is
important not to restrict ourselves to examining the performance of a fixed set of pre-
diction and trading rules. The Genetic algorithm (GA) provides an effective method
for searching over a huge space of potential rules, both linear and non-linear, at each
period. A GA is essentially a computer based optimization procedure which uses the
evolutionary principle – the survival of the fittest – to find an optimum. It provides
a systematic search process directed by performance rather than a gradient and in
principle can find a global optimum in otherwise intractable problems if the required
computing resources are available. In practice computational power is limited and so
all GA rules, including those derived below, will not necessarily find the best possi-
ble performance but the best given the computing and time constraints we have been
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forced to impose on the search process. Never the less the rules selected below will have
evolved from searching over millions of competing rules and their performance is there-
fore known to be at least “good” if not achieving the global optimum. This is obviously
sufficient for our purposes since if predictability is found with these “good” rules then
we know we must at least have understated the potential degree of predictability that
might exist. Moreover our results should have much greater applicability than those
who have considered a fixed set of technical rules – however large 4.
3.2 Genetic Algorithm
Genetic algorithms have been successfully applied in a number of financial applications,
most notably for our purposes, Dempster and Jones (2001), Dworman, Kimbrough and
Laing (1996), Chen and Yeh (1997b), Chen and Yeh (1997a), Neely et al. (1997), Allen
and Karjalainen (1999), Neely and Weller (2001), Chen, Duffy and Yeh (1999), Arifovic
(1994), Arifovic (1995), Arifovic (1996), Arifovic (1997).
Starting from an initial set of rules a genetic algorithm evaluates the fitness of
various candidate solutions (trading rules) using the given objective function of the
optimization problem and provides as an output solutions that have higher fitness val-
ues. Two operations of crossover and mutation are applied to create a new generation
of decision rules based on the genetic information of the fittest candidate solutions
Crossover operation: for the crossover operation one randomly selects two parents
from the population based on their fitness, then take a node within each parent as a
crossover point selected randomly and the subtrees at the selected nodes are exchanged
to generate two children. One of the offspring then replaces the less fit parent in the
population. In our implementation we use a crossover rate of 0.4 for all individuals in
the population. This operation combines the features of two parent chromosomes to
form two similar offspring by swapping corresponding segments of the parents. in our
case these segments are represented by sub-nodes of binary tree. The intuition behind
the crossover operator is information exchange between different potential solutions.
Mutation operation: to mutate a rule one selects one of its subtrees at random
and replaces it with the new randomly generated tree. This operation guarantees the
refreshment of the genetic code within the population. The best 25% of rules are not
mutated at all and the remaining are mutated with probability 0.1. The intuition
behind the mutation operator is the introduction of some extra variability into the
population.
The elements of every trading rule are terminals and operations and the rule pro-
4We are also interested in the simplicity of the rules selected by the genetic program and how
these may correspond to robust decision rules that may justified formally in the face of uncertainty
as opposed to risk in financial markets.
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vides a boolean value as the output. If the value of the rule is “true”, it gives the signal
to “buy”USD, or equivalently, it indicates the USD-DM exchange rate is increasing.
If the rule is “false”– the trader “sells”USD. The rules are represented in the form of
randomly created binary trees with terminals and functions in their nodes. We employ
the following choices of operations and terminals;
Operations: the function set used to define the technical rules consists of the binary
algebraic operations {+,−, ∗, /,max,min}, binary order relations {<,>,≤,≥,=}, log-
ical operations {and, or} and unary functions {abs,−} of absolute value and change of
sign.
Terminals: the terminal set contains the variables {pr, ret, lagpr1, lagpr2, lagret1,
lagret2, maxpr5, maxpr10, maxpr20, minpr5, minpr10, minpr20, avgpr5, avgpr10,
avgpr20, avgret5, avgret10, avgret20}, where the first 6 variables indicate currently
observed price and returns of USD in terms of DM and their lag values, maxpr and
minpr as well as maxret and minret denote maximum and minimum price over the
indicated period of the exchange rate and its return respectively, avgpr and avgret
are average value prices and returns over the period. We should make clear that by
“period”we mean the irregular instants of time when the transaction is realized.
For the cases when the algorithm searches over order book information we also use
the following additional variables: bestbid, bestoffer, bestbidq, bestofferq, quantity,
liqbid, liqoff, dpthbid, dpthoffer, time, which represent best bid, best offer, best bid
quantity, best offer quantity, transaction quantity, liquidity from the bid side, liquid-
ity from the offer side, market bid depth, market offer depth and duration between
transactions in seconds respectively. All their first and second lagged values are also
included in the information set.
The terminal set also includes real numbers in the range from 0 to 10 as terminal
constants.
The following example illustrates the sort of trading rule that can be generated.
Figure 1: An example of a genetic tree for a trading rule
This example corresponds to the following trading rule:
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– switch to USD if the lagged value of the exchange rate is greater than or equal to
the average exchange rate over last 10 periods or the second lag of the return is greater
than zero;
– otherwise hold DM.
The evolutionary algorithm can be summarized as follows:
1). Create randomly the initial population P (0) and initialize the number of itera-
tions i = 0.
2). Set i := i+ 1.
3). Evaluate fitness of each tree in the population using the fitness function.
4). Generate a new population (i.e. the set of all genetic trees) using the genetic
operations (crossover and mutation)
5). Repeat 2)–5) while i < N .
In the program we use the population size of 100 individuals and provide 50 itera-
tions of the algorithm (that is, N = 50).
The complexity of trading rules are controlled in a probabilistic manner. In fact,
the probability for a binary node to appear in the tree is smaller than the probability
of a unary one which prevents the tree to become very large.
3.3 Fitness functions
A fitness value also needs to be assigned to each of the generated trees or trading rules in
order to solve the optimization problem. We use three different fitness functions. First
we consider the percentage of correctly predicted change of directions in the exchange
rate by the composite technical rule. Although the trader as described in the previous
section, does not make a transaction until the exchange rate changes sufficiently, the
information received during the period when the trader remains passive is used to
compute the current values. For example, if the exchange rate et−1 = et = e, the
values of variables price and lagpr1 are both set to e. We denote the percentage of
correct directional change predictions by DC.
As a second fitness function we consider the economic value of the trading rule
measured by the cumulative daily returns. We assume that the investor starts with an
initial wealth in DM and considers whether to switch all their wealth into USD or take
a short position in dollars. The investor is allowed to trade only if the exchange rate
level exceeds the k inertia band created by uncertainty as discussed in the previous
section. Let zt denote the state of the investor’s portfolio at time t. That is, zt = 1
if they take a long position and zt = −1 if they are short. We assume zt does not
change while the level of the exchange rate et lies within the k-band. The fitness of
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each trading rule is then calculated as
Rc =
∏
t
(1 + ztrt)− 1,
where rt =
et−et−1
et−1 is the one-period return of the exchange rate et For convenience, we
present the results adjusted to the daily basis form, i.e., R = (1+Rc)
1
2 andR = (1+Rc)
1
3
for in-sample (2 days) and out-of-sample (3 days) returns respectively.
A critical issue is how to take account of transaction costs when calculating the
economic value of the trading rules. This provides the third form of the fitness function
we consider. Under proportional transaction costs with rate θ the cumulative return
can be calculated as
RTCc =
∏
t
1 + ztrt
(1 + 2θ)h(zt)
− 1,
where h(zt) =
|zt−zt−1|
2 .
5
4 Data
The data we have used was provided by Reuters and represents all transaction and
order book information on USD-DM trades on DM2000-2 electronic dealing system
over the week starting 5th October 1998. This electronic market is open 24 hours each
day of the week and we have not made any adjustments for overnight periods GMT.
The dataset consists of details relating to the 18065 transactions that occured during
the week. It includes the transaction prices, best bid and ask quotes, transaction and
best quote quantities, the duration between transactions, depth and liquidity on each
side of the limit order book. We use the first two days (Monday and Tuesday) as
the in-sample period which is used by the genetic programming in order to find those
trading rules with the best performance. The out-of-sample period consists of the last
three days and is used to examine the significance of the performance of the selected
trading rules.
5 The Formal Testing Framework
Since the ability to predict the market’s direction may not lead to excess profits if
returns are greater in absolute value at times when mistakes on direction are made than
at times when no mistakes on direction are made we need to consider predictability
5We have been provided with the transaction costs in terms of spreads used by a major UK based
hedge fund.
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Figure 2: Tick-by-tick USD/DM exchange rate time series from 5.10.1998 to 9.10.1998.
The in-sample period Monday – Tuesday, the out-of-sample period Wednesday – Friday.
both in terms of directional accuracy (DA) and economic value or excess predictability
(EP) (see Anatolyev and Gerko (2005)). While a DA test like that proposed by Pesaran
and Timmermann (see Pesaran and Timmermann (1992), Pesaran and Timmermann
(1994)) will be significant in this case an EP statistic will not, hence we need to employ
both. We briefly describe the DA and EP tests we have employed in Appendix.
In addition since our data is irregularly spaced and dependent we need to clarify
exactly how we have implemented White’s Reality Check for Data Snooping. Data
snooping involves the re-use of the same sample data in multiple hypothesis testing
and not recognising the impact that prior decisions in the testing sequence have on
the significance levels to be used at any stage subsequently down the chain. Our GP
approach in fact carries out a simple machine search that involves no explicit inference
and we also employ out of sample data to examine predictability but never the less
the potential for data snooping still exists with the use of genetic algorithms and so
we need to take the issue seriously. The correct statistical approach with sequential
inference with multiple model selection is to employ Bonferroni Bounds but this would
clearly be infeasible in our case with millions of rules to check and so we have no
alternative but to employ simulation methods, in fact subsampling as opposed to the
stationary bootstrap, to compute the Reality Check. Based on the procedure proposed
by White (2000), the Reality Check enables us to calculate true empirical p-values of
the test statistic based on the null of no predictability beyond the benchmark. The
formal framework used for the Reality Check is provided in the Appendix.
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As performance measures for the trading rules we naturally use the fitness functions
defined in Section 3. Since the null hypothesis is formulated in terms of ability to beat a
benchmark, in the case of testing for directional change we take the natural benchmark
as 50%. That is, ϕ1 = DC− 50. For the case of the economic value fitness function we
consider a zero return as the benchmark (due to the symmetry present on the foreign
exchange market). Thus, ϕ2 = log(R) and ϕ3 = log(RTC) for models without and with
transaction costs respectively.
Since our data is irregularly spaced and dependent we need to be careful exactly
how we have carried out the re-sampling in both the pure price and order book cases.
Pure price information
The case, where technical indicators are based purely on the historical values of the
exchange rate is relatively simple regarding the implementation of the bootstrap. To
compute the Reality Check p-values, we generate 1000 independent block bootstrap
re-samples and construct the empirical distribution consisting of 1000 realizations of
V ∗ statistic. In particular, we build a sample of the one-period returns of the exchange
rate from moving blocks of random length. The length of each block is geometri-
cally distributed with probability 0.01 (see Politis and Romano (1994))giving a mean
block length of 100 transactions. Then the time series of the exchange rate levels is
constructed from the sample of bootstrapped returns.
All order book information
When the trading rules are based on all order book information it becomes more
complicated since it is necessary to resample the whole order book. Bootstrapping just
the returns time series does not work in this case because the price levels are directly
connected to their marks such as the best bid and offer levels, liquidity, depth etc
and constructing price levels from bootstrapped returns would break this dependency.
Hence, we resample the whole order book using fix length (for simplicity) blocks of 200
transactions and then construct returns of the exchange rate from its levels. In doing so
we are faced, however, with possible jumps in price levels which would not be present in
the original sample. These jumps would have a considerable impact on the cumulative
returns and the genetic algorithm would concentrate on predicting the jumps and this
fact can cause a bias of the p-values. To avoid this inconvenience we shift blocks of
prices and bid and offer levels (the other order book information remains untouched) in
such a way that the first price value of a new block coincides with the last price value
of the previous block. This implies that since the number of observations is n = 18065
and the selected block length is equal to 200, we have manually set approximately 90
return values to be equal to 0. In the original data among 18065 observations, there
16
are about 5000 observations with zero return. As specified in Section 2), the investor
does not trade until the exchange rate level goes out of the k-band. Therefore, we
claim that this procedure will have little impact on our results but does enable us to
bootstrap irregularly spaced dependent data from an order book.
For both pure price information and all order book information cases, the in-sample
period has the same number of observations as the original – 9046.
Comparing our use of the Reality Check to the existing literature examining prof-
itability of technical rules (for instance Sullivan, Timmermann and White (1999), Hsu
and Kuan (2006)) we would claim that the use of the genetic algorithm should provide
a much more reliable procedure than employing a fixed universe of technical rules.
Indeed, the data-snooping analysis strongly depends on the particular set of possible
alternative trading rules which could be used by the investor. Sullivan et al. (1999)
consider 7,846 technical indicators while Hsu and Kuan (2006) expand this set up to
39,832 trading rules. However, the genetic programming technique allows us to con-
sider many more strategies depending on the initial parameters of the algorithm (the
number of repeats, initial population size, rules’ depth, etc). On the one hand, it is
impossible to calculate performance for all possible rules. At the same time, however,
the Reality Check requires only the maximum of the difference in performance of the
real and bootstrapped data. Hence, by setting the maximum of this difference as a
fitness function of the algorithm we can simply generate an empirical distribution for
the evaluating the p-values using the GP procedure. Plots of this distribution are
presented below.
6 Results
Our aim is to find among the set of all trading rules those which have the best per-
formance in the sense of predicting both correct directional change of the exchange
rate and of economic value. We also consider the market with and without transaction
costs. In addition we explore the uncertainty market timing issue by incorporating
5 levels of the inertia parameter k representing the investor’s attitude to the uncer-
tainty. We employ 3 different fitness functions and two different information sets – past
price information and then order book information plus past prices. This immediately
shows we have too many different cases to sensibly consider in detail so we will limit
our discussion to drawing out several particular results.6
Using the genetic algorithm described in Section 3 we search for the best 20 rules in
the sense of the percentage of correct directional predictions. We also report the average
of the best 20 rules since this may provide both a more robust measure of performance
6The full set of results can be obtained from the authors on request.
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and more closely reflect how traders use technical rules. In order to produce 20 rules
the algorithm needed to be run approximately 25 times in each case since optimal rules
that were found were not included twice in order to provide the 20 presented in the
tables below. This indicates in the same manner the degree to which the algorithm
has actually found the global optimum. Tables 1 – 5 report the performance of the
best trading rules, their in-sample and out-of-sample percentage of correct directional
predictions (columns 1 and 2) as well as their economic value (cumulative returns
adjusted to a daily basis) with and without transaction costs (proportional with the
rate θ = 0.0001) (columns 3 and 4) for the five different values of inertia parameter
k. The heading of each table indicates which fitness function has been used. Columns
5 and 6 report the results of the Pesaran-Timmermann (PT) test, columns 7 and 8
the Anatolyev-Gerko (AG) test and column 9 reports the p value corresponding to
White’s reality check. The fitness function determines the performance criterion for
the RC. A p value below 0.05 indicates rejection of null (at 95% of confidence) that
there is no predictability or profitability in each case. Tables 6 – 10 contain the same
information about the best 20 rules based both on all order book information and past
price information7.
If we analyze the tables we can see taking Table 1 as an example that the fitness
function used to select the optimal rules was directional change. The PT test (columns
5) clearly shows directional predictability as we reject the null of no predictability for
all 20 rules at the 95% of confidence level including the best performing rule shown in
row 1 and the average of all the rules shown in row 21. White’s Reality check confirms
this as shown by the last column. There is no economic profitability under transactions
costs but that is not surprising since the rules were not selected on that basis. As k
increases through the following tables then if we look at table 3 when k = 0.001, this
means that a price change has to move the third decimal point in the exchange rate
to allow the trader to trade. Now we find clear predictability both in terms of sign
and profitability for both the maximum rule and the average again supported by RC
even though the fitness function for selected rules is directional change. The average
returns for the max rule in this case with transaction costs are 7.37% on a daily basis.
As k increases further, the number of transactions that are allowed can become very
small (5239 for k = 0, 1494 for k = 0.0005, 738 for k = 0.001, 116 for k = 0.005 and
46 for k = 0.01 in our case) and the reliability of the inference for all tests becomes
questionable. When k = 0 then the trader is allowed to trade at every instant which is
not sensible and in this case it is not surprising that we can find no profitability from
Table 1 (column 4) under transactions costs.
Tables 6 – 10 show the results from the same design with directional change as the
7As an in-sample period (search period) we use the data for Monday and Tuesday. In order to test
the out-of-sample performances of the rules we consider the period from Wednesday.
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fitness function but including the order book information in that available to the GA.
Table 6 may be compared with Table 1. The results are generally worse and this result
is reflected throughout the remaining exercises. Adding the order book information
seems to create less reliability and stability in the results. We discuss possible reasons
for this below once we have considered all the results.
We also repeat the same analysis with Economic Value as the fitness criterion
for rule selection with and without transaction costs. In this case we can see from
Table 11 (without transaction costs, k = 0.001) that the AG test indicates economic
profitability which is supported by White’s RC and the third column shows the daily
returns that could be achieved by the max rule (4.484 %) and by the average of all
the rules (2.19%). In Table 12 we can see significant profitability with k = 0.005 using
order book information which is supported by all the tests of (4.418%) with the max
rule and (1.299 %) under transactions cost – once again values that are lower than
under the information set that just included prices.
It is in general difficult to beat the zero return benchmark (as well as buy and hold
strategy8) when we select rules on the basis of transactions costs since buy and hold
incurs transactions costs twice. However Table 13 which introduces transaction costs,
with k = 0.005 shows significant profitability which is supported by the AG test for
the max and average rules of roughly 4% a day with the RC significance levels around
7.5% and 8.95%.
Throughout all of these tables it is critical to notice the importance of the inertia
parameter. It seems that either values of k = 0.001 or k = 0.005 deliver the best results
fairly consistently. Table 14 collects this information together and shows the results for
all fitness functions for the average rules at different values of k. This table together
with Table 15 provides the critical summary of our results regarding market timing
and inertia as captured here in the k parameter. Again if we track along the k = 0.005
line we will generally find clear directional predictability and profitability. The same
holds for Table 15 which collects the same information together for the maximum rule.
The same tables showing results for including order book information again indicate
the slight reduction in performance that we find from including the structure of the
order book in the informational set.
Table 16 and the following distributional plots indicate the probability of losing
money, Ω being the ratio of probability above the break even point to that below
it. This measure has been put forward as a general portfolio performance criterion
superceeding the Sharpe Ratio by Keating and Shadwick (2002). This is shown quite
clearly in the figures that then follow for each case.
8We have also computed all the simulations using buy and hold as the benchmark and there is little
difference between these results and the zero benchmark reported in the tables. Again full results can
be provided by the authors on request.
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In Table 17 we provide the results for the out of sample performance of several
standard technical indicators for different values of k and it is clear their performance
is weak in comparison.
Finally maybe one of the most important issues is how to apply the methodology
described in this paper in practice. How to recognise, based on the in-sample per-
formance, which of the 20 selected (best) rules will be profitable out-of-sample? One
possibility is to take the rule with the maximum in-sample return, which however may
not be optimal in many cases, and a more robust and stable choice is the average rule
we have described above. This approach also has the disadvantage that it tries to make
a prediction for the whole out-of-sample period at once. Perhaps more consistent with
reality we have also considered the performance of only one step ahead predictions
using a recursive procedure. Once we have got the in-sample dataset we run the GA to
find the rule with the best in-sample performance and apply this rule to make a deci-
sion for the next period of time. After making the transaction we observe next period’s
price and update our information set using a rolling window procedure. Based on the
updated in-sample dataset we repeat the GA in order to find the trading indicator for
the next period and so on.
As an illustrative example consider the use of this recursive strategy with the eco-
nomic value fitness function without transaction costs. The uncertainty bound is de-
termined by the parameter k = 0.005 (this choice looks reasonable from the results
reported above). The initial in-sample is considered to be Monday-Tuesday and we
roll the in-sample window up to the last observation of Friday.
Since the GA is unable to find the global maximum of the fitness function and only
approximate it to some extent, the results of the recursive procedure imply different
trading rules for every separate recursive run through the data (even for the same
dataset). Thus, the final return of the recursive procedure is a random variable because
of the random mechanism built in the GA. Therefore, in order to get a more realistic
picture of the recursive trading rule we provide 100 independent runs through the
dataset for both pure price and all order book information strategies. The average
daily return for the pure price information model is µ = 6.885% and its standard
deviation is σ = 1.799. The respective average and standard deviation from using the
order book information are µ = 3.813% and σ = 2.131. In the first case the hypothesis
H0 : µ ≤ 0 is rejected with 95% of confidence while for the second case it is rejected
only at 90% confidence level.
This reflects the same surprising result we found above with the static implemen-
tation of the method (that the performance of the strategy which exploits the order
book information performs less well than that with just pure price information). Apart
from the explanation that the market price acts as a sufficient statistic and so there is
no need to use the structure of the order book it may also be that to predict future
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prices the order book contains non-informative or redundant variables which have any
little or no predictive power. We can see from the tables that the in-sample perfor-
mance is usually better for the order book strategies and this seems to suggest that
the GA has more to work on when constructing a “good” trading rule. However, its
ability to forecast in-sample prices refers more to capturing the characteristics of a
particular dataset rather then to its out of sample predictability9. Moreover, even for
the in-sample period this ability does not appear to be very efficient as the implied
trading rules look quite complicated and sophisticated unlike the best pure price rules
which can often be very simple indeed. This may suggest the order book rules would
not be robust. These sophisticated order book rules are in fact less stable during the
genetic selection process because any small mutation can easily “kill” the rule. The
probability that a simple rule will mutate is smaller as it is less sensitive and therefore
they are more stable. The GA can at least keep their performance as a benchmark for
genetic selection for a longer time. Complicated rules are destroyed more frequently
and the GA has to re-start with building well performing trading rules from the very
beginning. Hence, this process takes more time and machine resources and so is less
likely to converge towards the optimum. In order to filter out useless variables by the
GA, we would need to increase number of repetitions of the GA substantially and,
probably, the population size.
Thus, there are two different ways as to how to use the order book information
efficiently. The first is a machine based method – increase computer power, number
of repetitions, computing time and the population size. The second is a human based
method – very carefully select the variables which need to be included in the information
set for the algorithm. Our analysis does show that the order book information does
have some predictive power but it is not very efficient probably because of the unclear
signals regarding predictability. Alternatively economic theory may have been shown
to be correct and the market clearing price is in fact a sufficient statistic.
7 Conclusions
This paper has examined the predictability of exchange rates on a transaction level
basis using both past transaction prices and the structure of the order book. Formal
tests for the ability of genetically derived trading rules, that may be likened to techni-
cal rules, are applied to one week of tick-by-tick data on the USD-DM exchange rate
drawn from Reuters DM2002 electronic trading system. The Pesaran-Timmermann
test shows clear ability to predict directional changes in the exchange rate and the
economic value of predictability taking account of transaction costs is shown to be sig-
9A similar problem affects the naive use of Neural Networks.
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nificant out-of-sample using the Anatolyev-Gerko test. These conclusions rest critically
however on the market timing decisions and the implied frequency of trades which are
controlled by what we refer to as an inertia or uncertainty parameter which follows
from the Bewley’s preferences for decision-making under uncertainty. Some inertia in
trading is critical to recover profitability. If the trading system is allowed to trade
at every instant it clearly fails to show profitability but when trades are made only
when prices changes are of a sufficient magnitude then significant profitability appears
under transaction costs. These conclusions are confirmed using White’s Reality Check.
Somewhat surprisingly we do not find strong evidence that exploiting the order book
structure aids predictability.
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Bootstrap distributions
Figure 3: Bootstrap distribution of maximum of
DC based on pure price information net of 50%.
k = 0.001
Figure 4: Bootstrap distribution of maximum
of DC based on order book information net of
50%. k = 0.001
Figure 5: Bootstrap distribution of maximum
of R based on pure price information net of buy-
and-hold. k = 0.001
Figure 6: Bootstrap distribution of max of R
based on order book information net of buy-and-
hold. k = 0.001
Figure 7: Bootstrap distribution of max of RTC
based on pure price information net of buy-and-
hold, θ = 0.001. k = 0.001
Figure 8: Bootstrap distribution of max of RTC
based on order book information net of buy-and-
hold, θ = 0.0001. k = 0.001
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Appendix
8.1 Pesaran-Timmermann Test
The Pesaran-Timmermann statistic is used to test the null of no market timing or
that the proportion of correct predictions equals the proportion which can be expected
under the null of independence between the realised and predicted values. Let et be
the realised value of the exchange rate and zt – its forecast. Define the probabilities
P11 = P (zt < 0, et < 0), P12 = P (zt < 0, et ≥ 0),
P21 = P (zt ≥ 0, et < 0), P22 = P (zt ≥ 0, et ≥ 0).
The diagonal elements of this contingency table provide the proportion of correct
predictions. Pij denotes the probability of a realisation in the cell of the i′th row
and j′th column of the contingency table. In general, the Pesaran-Timmermann test
considers a number of categories (i, j ∈ {1, ...,m}; we only need to consider m = 2.
Denote by Pi0 =
m∑
j=1
Pij the probability of cells in the i′th row and P0j =
m∑
i=1
Pij the
probability of cells in the j′th column. The null hypothesis is expressed as
H0 :
m∑
i=1
(Pˆii − Pˆi0Pˆ0i) = 0
The test is based on the standardised statistic
sn =
√
nV
− 12
n Sn
a∼ N(0, 1),
where n is the number of observations, and
Sn =
m∑
i=1
(Pˆii − Pˆi0Pˆ0i)
Vn = (
∂f(P)
∂P
)′
P=Pˆ
(Ψˆ− PˆPˆ′)(∂f(P)
∂P
)P=Pˆ
Ψˆ is an m2 ×m2 diagonal matrix with Pˆ as its diagonal elements,
(
∂f(P)
∂P
)P=Pˆ =
{
1− P0i − Pi0 for i = j
−Pj0 − P0i for i '= j
When m = 2 this test is asymptotically equivalent to the Henriksson-Merton test
of market timing (see Henrikson and Merton (1981)).
8.2 Anatolyev-Gerko Test
The Anatolyev and Gerko (Anatolyev and Gerko (2005)) test of mean predictability
is based on both market timing and a trading rule. Essentially this is a Hausman
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test that compares two estimates of mean returns from a simple trading rule, both of
which will be consistent under the null of no predictability but will differ under the
alternative.
Let rt be the observed log-returns of the exchange rate and rˆt be their forecasts for
t = 1, ..., n. The forecasts depend on the past information Ft−1 = {rt−1, rt−2, ...}. Let
the trading rule of the investor be based on the forecast variable rˆt, in particular, the
investor takes a long position in USD if rˆt ≥ 0 and a short position in dollars if rˆt < 0.
Then the one-period return from using the trading strategy is Rt = sign(rˆt)·rt. The null
hypothesis is conditional mean independence so that H0 : E(rt|Ft−1) = const or that
rˆt and rt are independent. The expected one-period return E(Rt) can be consistently
estimated under the null by two estimators:
An =
1
n
∑
t
Rt
and
Bn = (
1
n
∑
t
sign(rˆt))(
1
n
∑
t
rt).
An estimates the average return from using the trading strategy whereas Bn estimates
the average return from using the benchmark strategy that issues buy/sell signals
randomly with probabilities corresponding to the proportion of buys and sells implied
ex post by the trading strategy. When rt is predictable investing in the trading strategy
will generate higher returns than the benchmark and the difference between An and
Bn will be sizable. The variance of the difference An −Bn is
V = V ar(An −Bn) = 4(n− 1)
n2
prˆ(1− prˆ)V ar(rt),
where prˆ = Pr{sign(rˆt) = 1}. The estimator for the variance is Vˆ = 4n2 pˆrˆ(1−pˆrˆ)
∑
t
(rt−
r¯)2 with pˆrˆ =
1
2(1 +
1
n
∑
t
sign(rˆt)). The excess profitability statistic is then given by
EP =
An −Bn√
Vˆ
d→ N(0, 1)
under the null hypothesis.
8.3 White’s Reality Check
The main idea behind the Reality Check is as follows; let ϕk, (k = 1, ...,M) denote the
performance measure of the k-th trading rule relative to some benchmark performance
or rule. The aim is to test whether there is a rule within the population that delivers
superior performance to the benchmark. The null hypothesis is then stated as;
H0 : max
k=1,...,M
ϕk ≤ 0.
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in other words there is no rule that delivers positive returns relative to the benchmark
i.e. beats the benchmark. To test this null, we need the distribution under the null,
White (2000) suggested using the stationary bootstrap method of Politis and Romano
(1994) to estimate the distribution of the test statistic V = max
k=1,...,M
ϕk. If we denote by
ϕ∗k,j the performance measure of the k-th trading rule calculated using j-th bootstrap
sample. The empirical distribution can be obtained using bootstrap realizations
V ∗j = max
k=1,...,M
(ϕ∗k,j − ϕk), j = 1, ..., B.
It shown in White (2000) that the distributions of V and V ∗ are asymptotically equiv-
alent. Comparing the value of the statistic V with the quantiles of the empirical
distribution of V ∗ we obtain the Reality Check p-values which are suitable for testing
the null hypothesis.
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